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+ 
Brazil’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (NAP) was launched on 8 
March 2017 – International Women’s Day – in the midst of a major political crisis that 
affected the content of the Plan and engagement of key institutions such as the Ministry 
of Justice (MoJ) and the Secretariat for Women’s Policies (SPM, from Portuguese). Still, 
active engagement by the military and foreign service and compromises between 
stakeholders enabled the development of the Plan. While a strong emphasis on Brazil’s 
international undertakings was upheld, the domestic challenges confronted by Brazilian 
women living in extremely unsafe areas of the country were left out, as were other central 
issues, including trafficking of women, the impact of armed violence and organised crime. 
Towards the end of the process, civil society participation and the inclusion of a monitoring 
and evaluation system were undermined by the rise of a conservative tone within ministries 
participating in the ministerial working group tasked with the responsibility of drafting 
the NAP. 
This paper examines the process that led to the drafting and launch of Brazil’s NAP and 
how this process ultimately influenced the Plan’s content, shaping future outcomes. We 
argue that there were domestic and international conditions that enabled Brazil’s National 
Action Plan to be drafted. Internationally, the normative advances of the Women, Peace 
and Security (WPS) agenda at the United Nations, and particularly in peacekeeping 
operations, were key to exercising pressure on Brazil’s efforts to implement the agenda. 
In the domestic realm, (1) the initial engagement of key civil society organisations with 
the WPS agenda; (2) increasing advances towards gender equality in the defence, security 
and foreign service sectors; and (3) the personal leadership of mid-level professionals in 
key ministries increased the government’s willingness to pursue a NAP. 
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2An outward-looking plan eliminated 
resistance to the NAP within more 
conservative sectors, particularly the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The 
leadership of that Ministry also enabled 
the advancement of the Plan, despite 
the political, economic and social 
turbulence affecting the country. At 
the same time, the complex domestic 
scenario made it virtually impossible to 
achieve consensus on certain issues 
and, as a result, three fundamental 
issues were purposely left out of the 
plan: (1) civil society participation in the 
validation and implementation of the 
NAP; (2) a robust system of monitoring 
and evaluation; and (3) strong content 
on arguably controversial issues, 
including women’s participation in the 
armed forces; harassment and sexual 
exploitation and abuse within military, 
police and foreign service institutions; 
trafficking of women; women’s burden 
in violent urban contexts; and the impact 
of armed violence (including small arms 
and ammunition) on women. 
It is important to note, however, that 
innovative content and processes were 
included throughout the NAP drafting 
process, namely: active participation of 
civil society in the drafting of the NAP text; 
a gendered approach to Brazil’s strategy 
to receive refugees; and the creation 
of an inter-ministerial working group. 
As a conservative tone gained traction 
in Brazilian politics – a major outcome 
from the 2018 presidential elections – 
the NAP’s duration was renewed for yet 
another four years in March 2019, despite 
the difficult context.
The paper is structured in four parts. The 
first part discusses the key factors that 
enabled Brazil to develop its own NAP. 
The second part describes its content. 
The third and fourth parts discuss the 
process through which Brazil’s NAP was 
built and how this process influenced the 
content as well as the main challenges. 
The concluding section offers some 
insights on the way forward in light of 
the renewal of the NAP in a time where a 
conservative government took office.  
THE ORIGINS OF BRAZIL’S 
NATIONAL ACTION PLAN
Since the launch of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1325 (2000), Brazil has taken 
meaningful steps towards protecting 
women through peacekeeping, such 
as the inclusion of gender issues in the 
pre-deployment training course by the 
Brazilian Peacekeeping Training Centre 
(CCOPAB, from Portuguese), and the 
development of cooperation projects 
to address sexual violence in conflict-
affected countries such as Haiti, Guinea-
Bissau and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo. Also, in 2012 the Brazilian 
Pluriannual Plan (PNPM), an important 
planning document from the executive, 
determined that civilian and military 
women’s participation in UN peace 
operations should be improved. However, 
those measures were not necessarily 
motivated by a coordinated or planned 
effort to implement the WPS agenda. 
Only more recently has Brazil taken 
concrete steps to implement the agenda, 
of which the launching of the NAP on 
8 March 2017 is the utmost example. 
Previously, discussions about the WPS 
agenda were virtually absent from all 
government circles, even though the 
country endorsed Resolution 1960 
(2010).1 Brazil’s strong identification 
as a pivotal actor when it comes 
1 At the time, Brazil was a non-permanent 
member of the UN Security Council, which 
explains its endorsement of the resolution. 
2 Kai Michael Kenkel, “South America’s 
Emerging Power: Brazil as Peacekeeper”, 
International Peacekeeping,17 (5) (2010): 
644–661; Eduarda Passarelli Hamann, “Brazil 
and R2P: A Rising Global Player Struggles 
to Harmonise Discourse and Practice” in 
The Responsibility to Protect – From Evasive 
to Reluctant Action? The Role of Global 
Middle Powers, ed. Hans Seidel Foundation, 
Institute for Strategic Studies, Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung and South African Institute 
of International Affairs (Johannesburg, 
2012), http://us-cdn.creamermedia.co.za/
assets/articles/attachments/42371_iss_
fromevasivereluctantaction.pdf#page=85. 
3 Seun Abiola, Cedric de Coning, Eduarda 
Hamann and Chander Prakash, “The Large 
Contributors and UN Peacekeeping Doctrine” 
in UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era 
Adapting to Stabilisation, Protection and New 
Threats, ed. Cedric de Coning, Chiyuki Aoi and 
John Karlsrud, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017): 
152–185.
4 Renata Avelar Giannini and Ivana Mara 
Ferreira Costa, “Brazil’s Incorporating a 
Gender Perspective in MINUSTAH” in Brazil’s 
Participation in MINUSTAH (2004-2017): 
Perceptions, Lessons and Practices for Future 
Missions, ed. Eduarda Hamann and Carlos 
Augusto Ramires Teixeira. https://igarape.
org.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Brazils-
Participation-in-MINUSTAH-2004-2017.pdf. 
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to international peace and security 
and its commitment to international 
peacekeeping efforts2 are the key factors 
behind the launch of the Plan, and go 
some way towards explaining why it is 
an outward-looking plan, focused on its 
foreign and defence policies. 
We attribute the advancement of Brazil’s 
NAP to a combination of international 
and national factors. The strengthening 
of the normative framework surrounding 
the WPS agenda at the UN was central 
to pushing Brazil to implement it. In the 
domestic arena, enabling conditions can 
be traced to 2012, when a presidential 
decree urged the Armed Forces to 
authorise women to join certain 
military schools, spurring debate in the 
government, academia and certain civil 
society organisations around the role of 
women in unstable settings. 
International Factors
Brazil’s diplomatic discourse has a 
longstanding tradition of reinforcing 
its role in the international peace and 
security architecture3. As a result, with 
the development of a strong normative 
framework in regard to the WPS 
agenda – resolutions, training modules, 
guidelines, structures and processes – 
pressure towards its implementation 
also increased. If Brazil was to 
demonstrate its commitment to the UN 
system and values through international 
peacekeeping, it would also have to 
respond to the increasing demands to 
implement the WPS agenda. 
In this context, Brazil’s military leadership 
of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti 
was key to advancing the debate within 
the defence sector.4 CCOPAB is among 
the first actors to discuss the agenda 
within Brazil and although its scope was 
limited to conflict-related sexual violence 
and sexual exploitation and abuse, it 
was an important space for reflection 
and debate.5 This is particularly the case 
5 Marcela Donadio, Resolución del Consejo 
de Seguridad y Planes Nacionales de Acción 
en América Latina, (Rio de Janeiro: Igarapé 
Institute, 2016).
6 Carol Cohn, “Mainstreaming Gender in 
UN Security Policy: A Path to Political 
Transformation?” in Global Governance: 
Feminist Perspectives, ed. Shirin M. Rai 
and Georgina Waylen (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008): 185–206.; Renata Giannini, 
Mariana Lima and Pérola Pereira, “Brazil and 
UN Security Council Resolution 1325: Progress 
and Challenges of the Implementation 
Process”, PRISM 6 (1) (2016): 179–197; Robert 
Egnell, “Gender Perspectives and Military 
Effectiveness: Implementing UNSCR 1325 and 
the National Action Plan on Women, Peace 
and Security”, PRISM 6 (1) (2016): 73–89; 
Donna Bridges and Debbie Horsfall, “Increasing 
Operational Effectiveness in UN Peacekeeping: 
Toward a Gender-Balanced Force”, Armed 
Forces and Society 36 (1) (2009): 120–130.
7 MINUSTAH’s gender statistics for 2004-2016 
can be download from: https://peacekeeping.
un.org/en/gender. 
8 Renata Avelar Giannini, “Promover Gênero 
e Construir a Paz: a Experiência Brasileira”, 
Igarapé Institute Strategic Article (Set/2014), 
https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/
uploads/2013/05/AE-09_PROMOVER-GENERO-
E-CONSOLIDAR-A-PAZ.pdf. 
9 Ibid.
10 United Nations, “Statement by the Permanent 
Representative of Brazil to the United Nations 
at the Security Council”, UN Doc. S/PV.7533, 13 
October 2015, 66. 
as the military sector has traditionally 
been the most challenging actor when it 
comes to implementing this agenda.6 
The obligation to increase the 
participation of women in peacekeeping 
was also a major incentive to foster 
debate on Resolution 1325. Brazil had 
an obligation to respond to the low 
percentage of female representation in its 
peacekeeping contingents (around one 
per cent at the time),7 a major reflection 
of women’s limited participation in the 
military at home. 
Another key instance where discussions 
around the WPS agenda thrived was 
within diplomacy, particularly the 
Brazilian Mission to the UN. As Brazil 
was a non-permanent member of the 
Security Council in 2010-2011, it actively 
participated in the debates about UNSCR 
1325. The country not only sponsored 
Resolution 1960, it also donated one 
million dollars to the United Nations 
High Commissioner of Human Rights 
to support survivors of conflict-related 
sexual violence in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC).8 Around 
the same time, a number of technical 
cooperation projects addressing gender-
based violence began, particularly in Haiti 
and Guinea-Bissau.9 
From that time on, particularly after the 
15th anniversary of Resolution 1325 
in 2015, Brazil’s engagement with the 
agenda was solid and continued. It 
publicly announced the drafting process 
of the NAP in 2015.10 It is also important 
to highlight that between 2016 and 2017 
Brazil presided over the UN Commission 
on the Status of Women, pushing for a 
leading role in the gender equality agenda. 
Domestic factors
Important advances when it comes to 
gender equality and women’s protection 
were advanced in Brazil during the 12 
years when a left-wing, progressive 
4government held office. The governments 
of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2002–2009) 
and Dilma Rousseff (2010–2016) created 
and strengthened a set of governmental 
bodies and agencies dedicated to 
the promotion of women’s rights. To 
illustrate, the SPM – a specialised body to 
address women’s issues with ministerial 
status – was created in 2003, and strong 
legislation on violence against women 
was approved in 2006. 
However, it is important to highlight that 
the WPS agenda never gained traction 
domestically during this period. We 
propose that there are two main reasons 
for that: (1) there was a general lack of 
knowledge about the WPS agenda, not 
only in the government, but also within 
civil society groups that could otherwise 
have pushed the government towards 
implementation; and (2) the WPS agenda 
has traditionally focused on conflict-
related contexts and Brazil, despite being 
the country with the highest murder 
rate in the world11 and a home to violent 
organised criminal groups, it is not 
officially at war. 
Debates surrounding the presence of 
women in the military had been intense 
since the 2012 decree. The Navy 
authorised women to enter its Naval 
School in the logistics branch, and the 
Army was already preparing to receive 
the first cadets in 2017.12 The changes 
led the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to 
create a Gender Commission in 2014 
to address issues related to women’s 
presence in the Armed Forces and their 
participation in peacekeeping operations. 
These processes were an opportunity to 
deepen debate and reflection about the 
role and participation of women in the 
Brazilian military, particularly in combat 
roles, a taboo subject until then. 
At the same time, an informal group of 
female diplomats compiled evidence 
of more than 100 cases of sexual 
harassment and abuse within their 
institution.13 In September 2014, the MFA 
created a commission to discuss race 
and gender inclusion.14 The institution 
also became an active participant in 
debates about Resolution 1325 both 
abroad and at home and engaged with the 
few civil society organisations dedicated 
to the WPS agenda. However, in order to 
advance with the NAP, the MFA needed a 
green light from other institutions as well. 
Despite the widening of the debate, some 
of the key pillars of WPS, particularly 
increased participation of women in 
international peace and security, and 
hence in the national military forces, 
encountered resistance. The elaboration 
of a NAP was interpreted by many as 
a way to impose feminism – an often 
misunderstood term within these circles 
– on the military.15 
In this context, three groups of actors 
performed an important role in putting 
in motion the process of elaborating a 
NAP. First, civil society, who were absent 
until then. The Igarapé Institute, a “think 
and do” tank based in Rio de Janeiro with 
research focused on the field of WPS, 
convened a seminal seminar in Brasilia 
in March 2014 with multiple government 
representatives to discuss the challenges 
the agenda faced in Brazil.16 The event 
enabled an honest conversation between 
different government sectors, including 
diplomatic service personnel, as well as 
representatives of the military, police, 
civil society and academia, about key 
challenges to advancing the WPS agenda, 
including the elaboration of a NAP. The 
seminar, which received the support from 
the MFA and the MoD, was a first step 
toward a continued conversation around 
the theme.  
Although the participation of civil society 
during the drafting process was limited 
to one organisation, that participant 
had full access to all meetings and was 
responsible for drafting the first draft 
version of each section. As a result, 
11 Robert Muggah, and Katherine Aguirre, “Citizen 
Security in Latin America: Facts and Figures”, 
Igarapé Institute Strategic Paper 33, (2018): 
1–57, https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/
uploads/2018/04/Citizen-Security-in-Latin-
America-Facts-and-Figures.pdf.
12 Presidência da República, “Lei N. 12.705, de 
8 de agosto de 2012”, accessed August 27 
2019, http://www.planalto.gov.br/CCIVIL_03/_
Ato2011-2014/2012/Lei/L12705.htm. 
13 Catarina Alencastro,“Diplomatas Relatam 
Casos de Assédio Dentro do Itamaraty”, O 
Globo, 1 December 2015, https://oglobo.globo.
com/brasil/diplomatas-relatam-casos-de-
assedio-dentro-do-itamaraty-18186656. 
14 Ministério das Relações Exteriores, “Março. 
Mês da Mulher”, Ministério das Relações 
Exteriores, accessed August 27 2019, http://
www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/component/
content/article?id=13387.
15  As members of the interagency working group 
tasked with the responsibility of drafting the 
NAP, the authors participated in formal and 
informal meetings where some of these claims 
were made by more conservative members of 
the group.
16 The programme for the event can be viewed at 
https://www.resdal.org/assets/evento-igarape-
mar2013-reporte.pdf.
although government representatives 
would later soften the language or delete 
important content, civil society had the 
opportunity to influence the content and 
the language of the text. The Igarapé 
Institute also informally consulted with 
other organisations on specific content. 
Secondly, it is important to highlight the 
major role played by mid-level professionals 
from the MFA and the MoD who had 
a personal interest in and background 
knowledge of the WPS agenda. Not only 
did they advance the technical details of a 
possible Brazilian NAP, they also discussed 
WPS with higher-level representatives and 
gathered the necessary political support 
for the elaboration of a Brazilian NAP. In the 
absence of a formal structure and process 
to discuss Brazil’s involvement with the 
WPS agenda, the personal leadership and 
interest of these professionals was key to 
framing the importance of Brazil launching 
a NAP in recognition of its role as an 
international peace and security guarantor. 
In fact, a major lesson learned from 
this process was that the framing 
strategy carried out by these mid-level 
professionals was a necessary condition 
for the approval from all sectors to 
elaborate Brazil’s NAP. The general 
interpretation that prevailed was that 
the plan would only formalise measures 
that were already underway. There was 
little expectation that the NAP would 
have strong content on the more delicate 
issues, such as sexual harassment, 
women in the military, trafficking of 
women, armed violence in urban contexts, 
monitoring and evaluation plans and civil 
society participation.
Another key institution that stimulated 
this change in fortunes for WPS in Brazil 
was the Pandiá Calógeras Institute, an 
independent research body within the 
MoD. Its representatives also engaged 
mid-level professionals who, besides 
carrying out research, participated in 
the MoD’s Gender Commission in order 
17 Mariana Lima, “O Brasil Precisa Adotar um 
Plano Nacional de Ação para Implementação da 
Resolução 1325 do CSNU?”, Pandiá Calógeras 
Institute internal working paper (2015). 
18 Pandiá Calógeras Institute, “O Brasil 
e a Resolução 1325 do Conselho de 
Segurança das Nações Unidas”, Pandiá 
Calógeras Institute https://pandia.defesa.
gov.br/pt/agenda-pandia/279-o-brasil-
e-a-resolu%C3%A7%C3%A3o-1325-do-
conselho-de-seguran%C3%A7a-das-
na%C3%A7%C3%B5es-unidas.
to influence the agenda. Pandiá made 
WPS one of its priorities.17 Its role in 
disseminating research and coordinating 
multi-stakeholder conversation enabled 
some key advances when it came to 
widening debates around the possibility 
of elaborating a NAP.18 It became clear 
that Brazil experienced key advances 
in the area, but lacked a tool to properly 
keep track of them.
Third, having the MFA lead the process 
through its Peace and Security Division, 
at the time headed by the first woman 
since its creation, was fundamental. She 
embraced the agenda and paid close 
attention to the process, with strong and 
careful leadership, even as the country 
was hit by a major political crisis. The 
MFA is recognised by domestic actors, 
public and private, as an institution that 
elaborates state policies, whereby the 
national interest prevails over the private 
interest of political parties, ideologies or 
powerful groups. This aspect, on the one 
hand, eliminated resistance and favoured 
overall continuity of the process. On the 
other hand, it resulted in a NAP focused 
on the international context and the 
country’s external performance.
THE DRAFTING PROCESS
Drafting took place between November 
2015 and March 2017 and can be 
divided into three phases. The first 
phase (November 2015 – March 2016) 
was dedicated to establishing the 
working group’s knowledge on the WPS 
resolutions and key pillars of the agenda, 
as well as developing an understanding 
of Brazil’s implementation efforts thus 
far. The second phase (March 2016 – 
November 2016) involved the drafting 
process, within a very volatile political 
environment. The third and final phase 
(November 2016 – March 2017) was 
marked by political negotiations among 
government actors to reach a consensus 
on the sensitive themes. 
6There are two main outcomes to be 
highlighted in the process. First, the 
creation of an official group within the 
MoD to evaluate the content of the 
plan, which contributed to fostering 
debates about the theme in a traditionally 
conservative sector. The second was the 
launch of the NAP despite the change in 
the government leadership, suggesting 
that Brazil’s engagement with the agenda 
goes beyond the interest of governing 
parties. However, a major challenge was 
the political turbulence that affected not 
only institutional membership of the 
group, but also changes in representatives 
and consequent disengagement with 
certain themes. 
Officially, the drafting process started in 
November 2015, when the MFA invited 
the MoD, Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and 
the SPM to join the interagency working 
group. The group would later be named 
after Bertha Lutz, in honour of the memory 
of the only female Brazilian delegate to 
the Conference of San Francisco, in 1945, 
where she successfully pushed for the 
inclusion of gender equality in the United 
Nations Charter.19 UN Women Brazil and 
the Igarapé Institute were also invited to 
join the group. 
At the beginning of the drafting process, 
a debate took place over what should be 
the focus of the Brazilian NAP. The NAPs 
from developed countries are mostly 
focused on foreign policy issues, while 
those of conflict-affected countries seek 
to strengthen gender equality in domestic 
affairs. Brazil is in an unusual position 
neither as a classic conflict or post-
conflict country or a typical developed 
donor country. However, the country does 
experience pressing security challenges 
and war-like scenarios due to the presence 
of various organised groups. 
At that point, under the leadership of the 
MFA, which formally coordinated the 
process, the decision was made that 
the Plan should be outward-looking. The 
19 Phoebe Braithwaite, “How Latin American 
Women Fought for Women’s Rights in the UN 
Charter”, Inter Press Service, 15 September 
2016, http://www.ipsnews.net/2016/09/how-
latin-american-women-fought-for-womens-
rights-in-the-un-charter/.
resistance of the Brazilian Chancellery 
to addressing internal matters such as 
public security instability as possible 
subjects for international debate or 
scrutiny was made clear. What is more, 
the beginning of the political crisis that 
ultimately led to the disengagement 
of the MoJ and SPM from the working 
group contributed to the absence of 
considerations regarding the domestic 
sphere in the Plan. 
During the drafting process, the first step 
was to agree on the key pillars of Brazil’s 
plan before specific meetings dedicated 
to each pillar were held on a monthly 
basis. Brazil’s NAP follows the traditional 
pillars of the WPS agenda (participation, 
prevention, protection and humanitarian 
cooperation), and includes another 
dedicated to promoting engagement 
and raising awareness on the agenda. 
Igarape Institute’s representative would 
draft each section, and the text would be 
debated and agreed among members of 
the group.  
High-level military buy-in is important when 
drafting a NAP: in its absence, fundamental 
issues would ultimately be left out. The NAP 
drafting process gave rise to increasing 
awareness on the WPS agenda within 
the military. The three armed forces had 
direct participation in the group and sent 
representatives (separate from those of the 
MoD) to almost all of the meetings. Almost 
half of all the members of the working 
group represented the defence sector. Prior 
to those meetings, an internal meeting 
among members of the defence sector 
would develop the Ministry’s position. The 
process turned out to be positive as several 
high-level officers deepened awareness 
on related issues, even if it was to pose 
counterarguments to the more progressive 
targets dedicated to increasing women’s 
presence in the military. 
The country’s major political crisis 
resulted in the impeachment of the then-
President, Dilma Rousseff in August 2016, 
which led to major changes throughout 
all ministries. Not only were leaderships 
substituted, but some ministries ceased 
to exist. In that context, there were 
significant setbacks regarding the human 
rights agenda in general, with little concern 
for gender representation in government.  
These concrete changes in leadership, 
along with the conservative tone of the 
new government, affected the NAP. For 
example, the Minister of Justice changed 
five times throughout 2016, severely 
compromising the participation of its 
representatives. SPM lost its ministerial 
status and ceased to exist as a separate 
entity. It was first integrated to the recently 
created Ministry of Women, Racial 
Equality and Youth and later into the 
structure of the Ministry of Justice and 
Citizenship. When the Plan was launched, 
SPM was part of the Ministry of Human 
Rights. A direct consequence of these 
changes was the absence or very limited 
participation of representatives of these 
institutions, which severely affected the 
inclusion of themes related to domestic 
affairs, such as women in the police, or 
the impact of organised crime on women 
in Brazil, among others. 
This absence becomes clear when a 
more careful analysis of the Plan is 
carried out. In spite of the previous 
positive note on the engagement of 
the National Committee on Refugees 
(CONARE, from Portuguese), the NAP 
devotes more attention to women’s 
participation in diplomacy and the 
military than the police. Furthermore, the 
two main ministries involved, Foreign 
Affairs and Defence, changed Ministers 
three times each throughout the process. 
At each change of management there 
was a need to present the agenda and 
status of the drafting process for the 
new authorities and their offices and to 
update and level the knowledge of the 
new mid-level members of the working 
group. This was particularly challenging 
when it comes to new conservative 
+
 The country’s major political crisis resulted in the 
impeachment of the then-President, Dilma Rousseff in 
August 2016, which led to major changes throughout 
all ministries. Not only were leaderships substituted, but 
some ministries ceased to exist. In that context, there were 
significant setbacks regarding the human rights agenda 
in general, with little concern for gender representation 
in government.  
members included in the working group, 
particularly from Defence. In the post-
impeachment process, conservative 
sectors felt more comfortable to express 
their views without embarrassment. 
There was also an expectation that 
the process of elaboration would be 
suspended, and some actors sought 
to associate the plan with the previous 
government and with a leftist ideological 
agenda fomented by international non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) 
with shadowy interests, as a behind-the-
scenes strategy to halt the process.
As a result, the third phase of the drafting 
process was marked by negotiations 
among public officials on the final content 
of the NAP. At that stage, representatives 
from UN Women and Igarapé were 
excluded and although the content of 
each of the pillars was ready, there was 
no consensus around a few themes, 
particularly civil society participation and 
monitoring and evaluation. In order to 
keep the NAP, all representatives agreed 
to a consensual Plan, which meant that 
some of the more sensitive issues for 
the military were left aside. The Plan had 
been originally conceived by some of the 
representatives as a four-year document, 
but its initial duration was decreased to 
two years (March 2017 – March 2018) 
by the MFA as a way of waiting for better 
conditions under which to produce a 
new one.
8 
Thanks to MFA’s leadership throughout 
the consensus-building phase, the 
perception that prevailed was that 
the plan was not associated with the 
Rousseff government, the agendas of 
neighbouring countries, or any ideological 
current or hidden interest. Rather, it was 
associated with the recommendations 
of the UN Security Council, with a 
consistent international agenda and 
with an irreversible domestic process in 
which women are gaining more and more 
space and autonomy and barriers based 
on gender criteria progressively fall.
 
It is also important to note that due to the 
political instability and discontinuity in the 
aftermath of the impeachment of former 
president Rousseff, the legal status of 
the plan ended up falling short, as it was 
not submitted to the National Congress 
or to the Presidency of the Republic. If it 
had been approved by the Congress, or 
by the Executive as a decree-law, the NAP 
would have a legal status and its content 
would have been mainstreamed to all 
other Brazilian laws, norms and executive 
strategic plans. At the end of the process, 
however, the support of the drafting 
bodies was made official only by letters 
of introduction from the four ministers 
involved, giving the Plan the status of 
merely a ministerial declaration.
 
To illustrate its shortcomings, within 
the MoD the plan was not officially 
included in the list of policy documents 
or in the official speeches of authorities. 
Measures that were already being taken 
on WPS continued, however the Ministry 
avoided making their association with 
the NAP explicit. In contrast, in the MFA 
the NAP has been highlighted in 
diplomatic communications and official 
speeches, showing a mismatch between 
the two main institutions involved in the 
drafting process. 
The NAP process also provided 
invaluable advances and instances of 
reflection and honest communication 
around its content. As mentioned, in 
the MoD the elaboration of the NAP 
initiated a new internal debate on gender 
in peacekeeping operations and on the 
WPS agenda. These topics, previously 
largely unknown, were discussed in depth 
by the Defence sub-group throughout the 
drafting process. While it has not always 
been possible to reach consensus on the 
goals, especially with regard to taboo 
themes such as sexual harassment 
legislation and women in the military, the 
discussions were unprecedented and 
planted seeds that may have an impact 
in the future.
 
A major absence during the drafting 
process was that of more entities 
representing civil society. Although 
the Igarapé Institute participated in 
the process from the beginning to the 
end, promoting the first meetings and 
executing the drafting of the first versions, 
it was the only NGO to participate 
effectively in the process. Going forward, 
it is of paramount importance to engage 
more organisations from civil society and 
from the Brazilian feminist movement 
that could push for a more transformative 
NAP and bring its content closer to the 
country’s domestic reality.
THE BRAZILIAN NATIONAL 
ACTION PLAN 
The Brazilian NAP20 is structured 
around four thematic pillars: 
1) participation, 2) prevention and 
protection,21 3) peacebuilding and 
20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Action 
Plan on Women, Peace and Security (Brasília: 
FUNAG, 2017), http://funag.gov.br/biblioteca/
download/1220-PNA_ingles_final.pdf.
21 Although these pillars have traditionally been 
separated, it was decided to put them together in 
Brazil’s NAP. They are deeply interrelated when it 
comes to the activities undertaken by the country 
aiming to protect women’s and girls’ human 
rights and prevent gender-based violence in the 
conflict contexts in which Brazil engages. 
+
 While it has not always been possible to reach consensus on 
the goals, especially with regard to taboo themes such as 
sexual harassment legislation and women in the military, the 
discussions were unprecedented and planted seeds that may 
have an impact in the future. 
humanitarian cooperation, and 4) 
awareness-raising, commitment and 
improvement. Each pillar contains one 
or two expected outcomes and a series 
of actions dedicated to reach it. The 
participation pillar focuses on increasing 
and improving women’s participation in 
peace and security processes, referring 
to both Brazilian women and the local 
women living in conflict and post-conflict 
situations where Brazil is engaged. 
The prevention and protection pillar 
describes actions aimed at protecting the 
human rights of all women and girls and 
preventing gender-based violence in the 
conflict situations where Brazil engages. 
This pillar also has strong content and 
an innovative approach when it comes 
to promoting a gendered approach to 
refugees and asylum seekers in Brazil. 
The peacebuilding and humanitarian 
cooperation pillar proposes actions that 
aim to strengthen a gender perspective 
in Brazil’s engagement in conflict and 
post-conflict situations. The awareness-
raising, commitment and improvement 
pillar refers to actions aimed at deepening 
Brazilian society’s general knowledge 
about the WPS agenda, engaging 
relevant actors with the implementation 
efforts and improving articulation with 
the civil society.
The NAP sets out two strategic 
objectives – gender mainstreaming 
and women’s empowerment – as 
fundamental to the achievement of 
inclusive peace and security processes, 
guaranteeing that all proposed activities 
of the NAP consider these two objectives. 
Furthermore, each activity has a primary 
responsible public body, and one or more 
co-responsible public bodies. The Plan 
also includes a background section on 
Brazil’s engagement with the agenda and 
women’s rights advances; one additional 
section on duration, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation; a glossary; 
and ends with some data on Brazilian 
women’s participation in international 
peace and security.
The NAP’s section on duration, 
implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation defines the NAP’s duration for 
a two year period, and determines that 
the four sponsor ministries will establish 
the monitoring mechanisms for the Plan’s 
implementation and that annual reports 
containing the implementation efforts, 
challenges and opportunities will be 
published. Although these have not been 
published, annual evaluation meetings 
took place in 2017 and 2018. The MFA 
and the MoD Gender Commissions had 
contributed to advancing this process 
until the MoD Gender Commission’s 
activities were officially suspended when 
the new Bolsonaro government took 
office in January 2019. In light of that, 
there are concerns that the ideological 
position of the current government may 
affect Brazil’s engagement with the 
agenda and the previous accomplishment 
of having the NAP as a state rather than a 
government policy. 
It is important to mention the lack 
of specific financing to support 
implementation or a monitoring and 
evaluation process. Neither the budget 
units of the sponsor ministries nor the 
federal budget bodies were involved in the 
drafting process, so the NAP was limited 
to activities that could be implemented 
with no need for extra funding. 
 
Despite these challenges, and in 
an overall context of backlash and 
conservatism in domestic politics, Brazil 
managed to approve a four-year renewal 
of the NAP, again led by the MFA. All the 
+
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actors previously engaged in the process 
participated in the renewal negotiations 
that took place between November 2018 
and March 2019. The renewal of the Plan 
was officially announced by the Brazilian 
Ministry of Defence at the 2019 UN 
Peacekeeping Ministerial Conference in 
March, at the UN Headquarters in New 
York.22 At the same conference, Brazilian 
Navy Lieutenant Commander Marcia 
Braga, winner of the United Nations 
Military Gender Advocate of the Year 
Award for her work as gender advisor 
in the Central African Republic, received 
the award from UN Secretary-General 
António Guterres.23 In the midst of a 
conservative context at the macro level, 
the government promptly capitalised on 
this award: it was welcomed at the MoD’s 
speech at the conference, and Braga was 
granted an important military medal by 
President Bolsonaro back in Brazil. This 
more positive context at the micro level 
also had an impact on the Plan’s renewal, 
which passed in spite of the general 
conservative environment. With this new 
four-year period approved, the Plan’s 
content and Brazil’s official commitment 
to WPS are secured, even though some 
important omissions in the original text 
were not yet addressed.
THE NAP’S CHALLENGES: 
NOTABLE OMISSIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR DOMESTIC 
POLICY
A major characteristic of Brazil’s NAP 
is that it is an outward-looking plan, 
and thus basically a foreign policy tool. 
While that was important in order to 
reach consensus among government 
representatives, the NAP did not respond 
to some of the most pressing needs vis-à-
vis the WPS agenda in the country. What 
is more, there are three fundamental 
issues that were purposely left out of 
the plan in order to achieve a consensus 
between defence and diplomatic sectors. 
These were: (1) civil society participation 
in the validation and implementation of 
the NAP; (2) a robust system of monitoring 
and evaluation, including key indicators to 
measure progress and an active working 
group to monitor implementation; 
and (3) strong content on key issues, 
including women’s participation in the 
armed forces, harassment and sexual 
exploitation and abuse within military, 
police and foreign service institutions, 
trafficking of women, women’s burden 
in violent urban contexts and the impact 
of armed violence (including small arms 
and ammunition) on women.  
Civil society participation
The MFA performed a leadership role 
that guaranteed minimum civil society 
participation by including at least one 
civil society organisation in the working 
group and carrying out an online 
consultation. Considering Brazil’s long 
history of military dictatorship, there is a 
natural distrust between certain sectors 
of government and civil society. The 
history of a violent and cruel military 
dictatorship on one side and the strong, 
often combative activism by civil society 
on the other increased the gap between 
these two groups. What is more, a 
perception that defence and security are 
not matters of public interest still persists 
in the country. As a result, there was clear 
resistance towards including more civil 
society participation.
 
Only one organisation was allowed to 
participate: the Igarapé Institute, which 
has a proven track record working on 
these themes and was considered a 
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 A perception that defence and security are not matters 
of public interest still persists in the country. As a result, 
there was clear resistance towards including more civil 
society participation.
22 See Fernando Azevedo e Silva, “Conferência 
Ministerial Sobre Operações de Manutenção 
da Paz das Nações Unidas – Nova Iorque – 
Mar 2019”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, https://
peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/
brazilian-statement-portuguese.pdf
23 UN Secretary General, “Brazilian Woman 
Peacekeeper Wins the United Nations Military 
Gender Advocate of the Year Award”, United 
Nations, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/
sg/note-correspondents/2019-03-26/brazilian-
woman-peacekeeper-wins-the-united-nations-
military-gender-advocate-of-the-year-award.
trusted interlocutor by all government 
institutions represented in the group. 
Although Igarape’s participation was 
significant, having managed to provide 
direct inputs into the NAP’s text, more 
diverse representation would benefit the 
content of the plan and its legitimacy 
among civil society groups. 
An informal process established by 
Igarapé enabled limited participation from 
civil society experts on specific themes, 
including on refugees, sexual violence 
and participation. Nonetheless, a wide 
consultation process was hampered 
by the challenges of convincing the 
defence sector that public oversight is 
necessary. As an alternative, the MFA 
created an online consultation for groups 
and individuals who wanted to send 
contributions, yet, the process lacked 
transparency and diversity. As the text 
was not made available it was hard to 
have groups engage with it. Furthermore, 
specific passages in the draft NAP text 
that clearly stated the need to include 
civil society in the monitoring process 
were excluded from the final text in 
order to achieve consensus with the 
defence sector.
UN Women also participated in some 
of the working group meetings. It was 
not involved, however, in the drafting of 
the plan and it could have been more 
active building more bridges between 
the working group and civil society 
organisations. For future iterations of 
the plan, it would be very positive if UN 
Women were more involved and enabled 
the construction of a network of civil 
society organisations interested in the 
WPS agenda.
Monitoring and evaluation system
Although the activities of each pillar are 
organised into a chart showing the related 
objectives, with pre-defined responsible 
and co-responsible bodies for each 
activity, the working group did not agree 
on measuring tools. So, although each 
activity provides the NAP with a tool for 
accountability, it lacks measurability. 
For example, the commitment in the NAP 
to increase in the participation of military 
women in peacekeeping operations – 
which in Brazil fell under one per cent of 
the deployed personnel at the time the 
NAP was drafted – is insignificant. In the 
beginning of the process, the proposal 
was that the Armed Forces could 
commit to a goal such as “eliminating 
all barriers to women’s access to the 
military career”, since it was clear that 
Brazil sends few women to peacekeeping 
operations because there are few women 
in combatant positions and limitations 
to access the required training. The final 
text fell short, lacking not only specific 
targets, but also clear language: that 
specific activity is described in the plan 
as “trying to broaden women’s access to 
the possibilities of the military career”. 
The general perception among 
government representatives is that 
a monitoring and evaluation system 
would be a way to criticise and expose 
the government. Hence, not sharing 
information would be the way to 
avoid public scrutiny. This perception 
undermined the construction of a robust 
system of indicators with clear targets 
to monitor implementation. In times of 
political crisis such as the one Brazil is 
currently experiencing, the possibility of 
monitoring the implementation efforts 
would have offered an opportunity for 
policy continuation.24 Still, the MFA called 
two meetings to evaluate progress, and 
+
 The general perception among government representatives 
is that a monitoring and evaluation system would be a way 
to criticise and expose the government. Hence, not sharing 
information would be the way to avoid public scrutiny. 
24 It is important to highlight that the political 
environment in Brazil is extremely volatile 
since the beginning of the new government. 
Although the NAP was indeed renewed, recent 
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although there was not much, there was 
some limited political will to continue 
conversations to advance this area in 
the future, as the renewal of the plan was 
accompanied by a call from the MFA to 
each of the bodies of the working group 
to launch voluntary additional indicators.
Strong content on key issues
There are a few issues that are known 
to be sensitive for some of the sectors 
involved in the Plan, particularly those 
strictly related to the participation of 
women in the Armed Forces. Despite 
recent advances, with the opening of the 
military academy to women, some of the 
issues directly related to women’s presence 
in the military confronted major resistance. 
In fact, all text that made references to 
increasing women’s participation was 
either cut or softened. What is more, 
activities that would be necessary if Brazil 
was to create an enabling environment for 
women’s full participation in the military 
were also left out. 
For example, one of the activities under the 
prevention and protection pillar proposes 
cooperation with local institutions in 
conflict-affected contexts to elaborate 
and implement specific legislation on 
gender-based violence, including sexual 
violence, and women’s access to justice 
and specialised services. It is interesting 
to note that the same Plan has a much 
less ambitious goal when it comes to 
domestic legislation to deal with cases 
of sexual abuse committed by Brazilian 
uniformed officers. 
Brazil supports the UN zero tolerance 
approach to sexual exploitation and 
abuse (SEA) and commits to rigorous 
processing of SEA cases committed 
by Brazilian peacekeepers. But it lacks 
the specific, appropriate legislation to 
tackle these cases, since SEA is not 
typified in the Brazilian criminal code. It 
was proposed that the NAP elaboration 
process could be used as a means 
to promote debate on the necessary 
updating of the Brazilian criminal 
legislation on this matter. However, this 
proposal was refused by conservative 
sectors in the Armed Forces, so the NAP 
is far more progressive when tackling 
specific measures to prevent SEA abroad 
than in its own territory. 
There were also other key transnational 
issues that were left out, particularly 
due to the strong resistance towards 
including in the NAP any issue considered 
domestic or exclusively related to the 
country’s sovereignty. For example, Brazil 
is among the top exporters of weapons 
in the world. Maybe because of that, 
there was a strong opposition towards 
any reference to the impact of armed 
violence on women and girls. Although 
it is not clear why there was such strong 
opposition, it is common knowledge that 
many retired military personnel work in 
the Brazilian arms industry and that there 
is a strong lobby within the Congress and 
other bodies against stronger legislation 
to limit arms sales, or even to make them 
more responsible.25
Another important issue that should 
be included in the next NAP is human 
trafficking. Women comprise the 
majority of victims of this type of crime 
in Brazil,26 being sold as sexual slaves 
around the world. Increasing cooperation 
mechanisms with other countries to 
combat this violent crime would be one 
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25 For example, limiting the amount of 
ammunition sold with the same tracking 
number or even improving tracking capacity. 
26 Agência Brasil, “Mulheres e Meninas São 
as Principais Vítimas de Tráfico Humano”, 
Agência Brasil, 30 July 2018, http://
agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/internacional/
noticia/2018-07/mulheres-e-meninas-sao-
principais-vitimas-de-trafico-humano.
of the many urgent actions to be included 
in Brazil’s next NAP. 
Finally, it is well known that Brazil 
considers the UN Security Council as 
a non-democratic body. The fact that 
the WPS agenda is a Security Council 
agenda brings challenge towards a 
more comprehensive approach that 
includes certain issues that are at the 
core of Brazil’s urban violence problems. 
On a more positive note, an important 
advance was made when it comes to 
the inclusion of a gendered approach to 
Brazil’s policy of receiving refugees and 
asylum seekers.27
Implications for domestic policy 
Although Brazil’s NAP is outward-looking, 
there are pressing domestic issues that 
could be part of it. Brazil is currently 
among the most violent countries in the 
world. In fact, as mentioned above, it is the 
first when it comes to absolute numbers of 
homicides.28 It is also one of the countries 
with the highest rates of femicides and the 
murder of women.29 Although very limited 
quality data is available on domestic and 
sexual violence, statistical estimates 
show that Brazilian women are taking 
the burden of the violence epidemic in 
the country, while the government lacks 
political will to implement effective policies 
on the matter.30 
The violence problem in Brazil – as in 
other countries in the region – is not 
related to situations of formal wars, 
although it certainly has war-like effects 
on communities, particularly those where 
organised crime is settled and dictates 
the rules. Even though Brazil has solid 
legislation on domestic violence, its 
normative framework does not account 
for the violent effects of urban and rural 
violence that affects women in Brazil.31 
Various forms of direct and indirect 
violence affect women on a daily basis, 
be it against indigenous women due 
to land disputes or marginalised black 
women living in communities controlled 
by organised crime. The fact is that the 
dynamics of urban and rural violence in 
this part of the world disproportionately 
affect women and that impact is taken 
for granted. A NAP that recognises 
those effects and includes public 
security and criminal justice institutions 
could address, or at least call attention 
to, the burden on women in Brazil’s 
violence epidemic. 
There was an expectation by civil 
society that, by the end of Brazil’s NAP 
duration, an opportunity to include these 
issues would arise. However, a very 
conservative political wing is now in 
office. Not only is this opportunity lost, 
but also the advances accomplished so 
far are under jeopardy. The extension of 
the plan’s duration is, for that reason, a 
major accomplishment and an attempt 
to maintain the country’s engagement 
with the WPS agenda, albeit only when it 
comes to its actions overseas. 
CONCLUSION 
The outcome of last year’s presidential 
elections in Brazil showed that the 
coming years will be marked by a turn 
towards more conservative views in 
regard to gender and women’s rights. 
As noted, the Brazilian MoD formally 
announced an extension of the NAP’s 
duration for four more years at the UN 
in March 2019. The renewal process 
included all former participants of the 
Bertha Lutz working group and was led 
by the MFA. An important development 
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the country, while the government lacks political will to 
implement effective policies on the matter. 
27 It is important to note that the implementation of 
the plan, including on issues related to refugees 
and asylum seekers, has been challenging, 
particularly due to budgetary constraints.
28 Shasta Darlington, “A Year of Silence Sees 
Brazil’s Murder Rate Hit Record High”, The New 
York Times, 10 August  2018, https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/08/10/world/americas/
brazil-murder-rate-record.html. 
29 Reuters, “Brazil: Four Women Killed Every 
Day in 2019, Human Rights Body Says,” The 
Guardian, 4 February 2019, https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/04/brazil-
women-killed-2019-rate-alarming-iachr.
30 Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, Anuário 
Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, (Fórum 
Brasileiro de Segurança Pública: São Paulo, 
2018), http://www.forumseguranca.org.br/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/Anuario-Brasileiro-
de-Seguran%C3%A7a-P%C3%BAblica-2018.pdf. 
31 “Maria da Penha Law”, Law 11340/06, 7 
August 2006, https://presrepublica.jusbrasil.
com.br/legislacao/95552/lei-maria-da-penha-
lei-11340-06.
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has been the invitation to all members to 
suggest indicators to monitor progress. 
The MFA has announced in its official 
site a set of ten voluntary indicators that 
it has committed to using.32 However, it 
was the only organisation to set targets. 
It is unclear whether the NAP will be 
implemented more than ever, engaging 
mid-level civil servants that remained in 
government agencies is key to keeping the 
NAP on the agenda for the next four years. 
Analysis and studies based on practical 
experience in building NAPs provide 
fundamental elements to elaborate high-
impact NAPs, such as: an inclusive design 
process; an established coordination 
system for implementation; identified 
and allocated implementation resources; 
and a results-based monitoring and 
evaluation plan.33 In Brazil’s NAP process, 
it could be stated that none of these 
elements has been fully accomplished. 
Nor could the WPS agenda in Brazil be 
described as the focus of strong and 
sustained political will, which some 
authors suggest is a key element for a 
high impact NAP.34 In fact, leadership and 
interest of mid-level public servants at the 
MFA, the MoD and other bodies has been 
fundamental to the process, but when 
it comes to the ministries and higher 
authorities, it could be said that Brazil 
has a NAP in spite of strong political will 
against the agenda.
There is room for the WPS agenda in 
the official speeches of high authorities, 
of course, mainly when its mention 
comes with no political cost and can be 
capitalised upon internationally. But the 
agenda is not prioritised domestically, 
and is seen as leftist and ideological, 
particularly by the current government. 
What is more, the absence of domestic 
issues in the NAP has ultimately created 
a distance between the NAP and women’s 
movements in Brazil. It does not respond 
to their needs. 
While a focus on the consensus was 
fundamental to enable Brazil to debut 
among the countries with a NAP 
and to keep being a part of it, strong 
content on pressing issues affecting 
Brazilian women is still necessary. In 
the meantime, all efforts to implement 
the current NAP should be highlighted 
and complemented, particularly in a 
political context that threatens the voices 
of women’s rights activists and their 
very existence. 
32 Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 
“Indicadores e Metas Voluntários do Plano 
Nacional de Ação Sobre Mulheres, Paz 
e Segurança”, Ministério das Relações 
Exteriores, http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/
plano-nacional-de-acao-sobre-mulheres-paz-
e-seguranca/20032-indicadores-e-metas-
voluntarios-do-plano-nacional-de-acao-sobre-
mulheres-paz-e-seguranca.
33 UN Women, Preventing Conflict, Transforming 
Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study 
on the Implementation of the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1325 (New York, NY: 
UN Women, 2015), 241, http://wps.unwomen.
org/pdf/en/GlobalStudy_EN_Web.pdf.
34 See: Miki Jacevic, “What Makes for an 
Effective WPS National Plan?” The Strategist, 
March 2019; Barbara Miller, Milad Pournik 
and Aisling Swaine, Women in Peace and 
Security Through United Nations Resolution 
1325: Literature Review, Content Analysis of 
National Action Plans and Implementation, 
(Washington DC: Institute for Global and 
International Studies, George Washington 
University, 2014), https://www.peacewomen.
org/assets/file/NationalActionPlans/
miladpournikanalysisdocs/igis_
womeninpeaceandsecuritythroughunsr1325_
millerpournikswaine_2014.pdf; Jan Marie Fritz, 
“Women, Peace and Security: An Analysis 
of the National Action Plans Developed in 
Response to UN Security Council Resolution 
1325”, Societies Without Borders 4 (2) (2009): 
209-225. 
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